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Egypt’s Opposition Parties: A “loyal” Opposition
Samy Asfour
Samy Asfour is a senior political science student at the American University in Cairo. His
research interests include the examination of various political systems and their structure as well
as their relation to the masses and the opposition.

Abstract: Opposition parties are often labeled as a loyal opposition rather than
competitor, due to their inability to formulate an alternative policy to the
government and create a strong popular base. These shortcomings can be
traced back to the foundations of the Egyptian multi-party system. This paper
attempts to examine the opposition party from another perspective and examines
the oppositional New Wafd party in terms of democratic party structure and the
degree of popular appeal.

Introduction
In spite of internal and external pressures of reform, which have been
accelerated since the War on Iraq, opposition parties in Egypt remain paralyzed,
unable to take positive action in the process of reform. Opposition parties may
be hindered by the government from participating in the decision-making process
and from playing an active role in Egypt’s transition to democracy on the political
level. Many studies in the literature have focused on blaming the regime for
restricting and curbing down political parties with all possible means, so that the
dominant party system remains intact. This school of thought neglects the fact
that opposition parties have not yet established democratic institutions, which
would be able to create a popular base and formulate alternative programs.
Moreover, researchers explain the weakness of opposition in terms of the
strength of outer-parliamentary movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood,
which was successful in mobilizing different societal forces dissatisfied with
Egypt’s political system. This perspective gives a partial answer to the
ineffectiveness of political parties but neglects the fact that the opposition parties'
contradicting policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood have led to a drastic
mistrust in their party ranks.
This research paper evaluates the internal effectiveness of opposition parties and
questions their ability to advance a reform agenda. While the paper does not
deny the constraints imposed upon political parties within the existing political
system, it assesses the internal structures of opposition parties, focusing on
issues such as board selection, party ideology and program and organizational
structure. Reforming the opposition parties would create a legitimate channel for
expression of popular discontent. In addition, people would not turn to outerparliamentary movements like Islamic fundamentalism and Leftist activism to
ensure that their views are aired. Securing a competitive multi-party system will
also ensure that political forces are ready to embrace broader public support. The
goal of this paper is thus to identify the defects of opposition parties as well as to
propose strategies to enhance their political role.
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Historical Origins of Political Parties
Before the emergence of political parties in Egypt, secret societies started as a
forum for elite groups and intellectuals who shared similar opinions and interests
on certain topics (Ebeid, 2003). However, due to the high rate of illiteracy
amongst the population and the absence of a representative assembly, those
political clubs did not have a potential to become a mass movement or rise to a
level of electoral organizations (Ebeid, 2003). Motivated by European principles,
those political groups assumed that the adoption of liberal principles would curb
foreign influence in Egypt and improve the standard of living. Therefore, there
was an assumption that the concept of political parties, representing the interests
of the people, would be as successful in the Middle East as it is in Europe. By
the end of the 19th century, the Nationalist Party (Hizb el Watani), which was
composed of underground groups and rich landowners, was circulating their
ideas of reform, despite press censorship and political persecution (Ebeid, 2003).
However, this party was more of a conglomerate of different civil society
interests, rather than an institution with a clear economic and social program
(Ebeid, 2003).
On the other side of the spectrum, the British established the Umma party, which
was created to counter the national party or, rather, to contain it (Ebeid, 2003).
The Umma party only consisted of a newspaper without any organizational
organs, let alone any members of the population. It was led by a small Westernoriented group of elites wishing to preserve the status quo and block any
attempts of reform. Therefore, after Egypt’s independence, the raison d’etre of
the existence of such parties disappeared and either dissolved themselves or
were incorporated in the State apparatus.

Lack of Partisanship
One of the factors hindering the opposition parties in being a credible forum for
political expression and an alternative to the regime lies in the lack of
partisanship that has plagued them since their establishment. Many opposition
parties were created in a hasty ad-hoc manner resulting from a political decision
from above rather than by a popular demand to challenge the status quo. This
clearly does not fulfill the requirements of being an opposition party, which
according to political scientist Nasr Mohamed Arif’s (2004) definition, “represents
a specific public interest [in] trying to be a competitive alternative to the existing
regime through legal electoral processes” (p.1). Instead, appears that loyalty to
the nation is prioritized over party goals even if it requires the subordination to the
existing regime. Indeed, for most of the opposition parties, national coherence
remains essential, so that the unity of society remains intact. Because the notion
of this emphasis on national unity, there is an antipathy to the word ‘hizb’, which
is the Arabic word of party (Ebeid,2003). Even under Nasser’s authoritarian rule,
the sole political party, known as the Arab Socialist Union, was not regarded as a
party but as a mass movement to include all classes and movements under its
umbrella in order both to control them and preserve national unity. As the Arab
Socialist union became a symbol for Egyptians to rule themselves and determine
their own fate, political opposition parties became increasingly irrelevant and
political parties began to be seen as an instrument for certain forces to
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undermine Egypt’s unity and to mobilize its supporters through a single issue
campaign. After the end of occupation, and despite the disappearance of
nationalism as a sole issue for political parties to gain legitimacy, Nasser’s regime
had no problems in labeling parties as ant-nationalistic and counterrevolutionary
and finding a variety of excuses to shut their activities down. Moreover, the
state’s administration, bureaucracy and military apparatus has replaced the
relevance of political parties in deciding economic and social issues. One can
conclude that there is a popular perception that membership in a party and the
pursuit of national goals cannot be compatible and are, thus, mutually exclusive.
As a result, political parties have learned to not address sensitive issues that
could be misunderstood by the public and used to discredit them. Therefore,
alternative policies remain difficult as long as there is an attempt by the parties to
compete on minor issues and drop their distinctive party programs for the sake of
national unity.

Opposition Parties are a Derivate of the Political System and adhere to its
principles
In Sadat’s era, the return to a multi-party system did not end the dominant oneparty rule but tried instead to incorporate other political fractions into the
government. The creation of the so-called forums (manabirs) of left and right wing
factions within the dominant rule can only be evaluated as a top-down approach
rather than an evolvement from the strata of society (Ebeid,2003). President
Sadat’s decision was not motivated by an attempt to enhance the multi-party
system and allow for people’s participation within a pluralistic system, but rather
to co-opt as many political opponents as possible to form a policy of “national
consensus”(Ebeid,2003). Therefore, the leaders of these forums were former
military officers who had carried out the 1952 revolution and were personal
rivalries to Sadat (Ebeid,2003). The fact that these leaders all belonged to the
apolitical military class hindered the rise of a new generation of independent
leaders (Ebeid,2003). One can suppose that these leaders accepted these posts
not to use them as a starting point for transforming these forums into opposition
parties but rather as a vehicle to boost their own career and to get a place in this
authoritarian system before being eliminated by Sadat. These half-hearted
attempts of political liberalization were only effective in bounding together several
ideological leaders into the system, and did not give the maneuvering space to
express conflicting ideas. Therefore, it becomes obvious that opposition parties
were not created from amongst society itself, but as a tool of the ruling party that
aimed to more closely observe different views and opinions.

In order to demonstrate the weakness of opposition parties, it is advisable to
analyze and evaluate one of the oldest and strongest opposition parties in Egypt,
the Wafd Party. The Wafd became the symbol for the struggle against foreign
domination in the beginnings of the 20th century and was regarded as a mass
popular party, which transcended lines of class and religion. After the party was
banned after the 1952 revolution, it reappeared in the political arena in 1987
(Hinnebusch,1984). However, the party’s activities were again suspended after
the regime tried to prove to the court that the party was not disbanded but
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dissolved itself after the 1952 revolution and when prominent members from the
old Were prohibited to act in politics (Hinnebusch, 1984). However, the higher
administrative court independent of the political party committee in 1983 decided
after a clear investigation that the Wafd is not a new party and has the right to
reform itself (Hinnebusch, 1984) The following sections should demonstrate, why
the New Wafd not have the tools to repeat its broad mass appeal and why it is
not able to formulate a program which can be regarded as an alternative to the
government.
Affiliation to Individuals shows a lack of trust in Political Parties
The 2000 Parliamentary elections clearly demonstrated the inability of opposition
parties to exploit the unpopularity of the government and form a strong opposition
in the new parliament. In elections, the ruling National Democratic Party suffered
a major setback after only 175 of its 444 candidates won, despite their use of
local connections and the application of all the media channels for their campaign
(Ebeid, 2001). This was quite a shock for Egyptian party institutions, because the
elections were assessed as the fairest in the history of the country, due to the
presence of a judicial review which prevented election frauds, intimidation and
the manipulation of ballot boxes (Ebeid, 2001). One of the reasons behind
peoples’ reluctance to vote for an opposition party was their desire to elect
individuals as independents, as opposed to those who belong to a party (Ebeid,
2001). 56% of the running independents won seats, which means that their
sympathies exceeded those candidates who run in a party list (Ebeid, 2001). The
trend in supporting individuals can be explained by the fact that the voters have
no trust in political parties but prefer to give their votes to individual candidates
with no party affiliation and who are not abided to represent outdated party
principles which do not find solution to the current date socio-economic
contemporary realities. One can say that three decades after the emergence of
the multi-party system, opposition parties remain “parties without followers for
people without parties” (p.86) as Makram Ebeid (2003) clearly infers.
The Wafd’s drop of its traditional secular character revealed the internal
crisis of the party
The chairman of the Wafd party, Nooman Gomaa’s predictions that the party’s
273 candidates would win 100 seats out of the 444 ones available in the People’s
Assembly were drastically contradicted when the Wafd just won 7 seats,
including two in the run-off elections (Ebeid,2001). The Wafd’s defeat in the 2000
elections demonstrated that the party’s internal rivalries, the resignation of
essential segments of society, and its failed campaigning did not allow it to be a
strong competitor to the government. The Wafd openly dropped its historical
secular orientation in order to achieve certain party goals, which antagonized its
closest supporters. Popular in the pre-1952 days for attracting broad segments of
society, in particular women, the recent election saw only twelve women running
for the party, a figure which does not reflect the diversity of party candidates
(Ebeid, 2001). One can suppose that the low number of female nominations is a
reflection of the party’s opportunistic belief that women are a liability and could
endanger the party performance (Ebeid, 2001).
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Likewise, the Wafd’s refusal to nominate many Copts due to its fear of the Islamic
trend has compromised the party’s secular position. Throughout its history, the
Wafd’s secular orientation gave Copts the opportunity to be mobile in a country
with a Muslim majority. Hinnebusch (1984) claims that Coptic membership
decreased in the New Wafd Leadership in comparison to their representation in
the old Wafd due to the chances given for Muslims in the Nasser years to fill
important ranks in the government, bureaucracy and parties. But such an
assumption remains questionable, due to the ability of the leadership to place
Copts in constituencies of a Coptic majority or in urban centers. On the other
hand, it is quite possible that Coptic members left the Wafd due their experience
of the 1984 election, in which the Wafd paradoxically joined forces with the
Muslim Brotherhood in order to get seats in the parliament, thus demonstrating
an “Islamic infiltration” of within its leadership (Ebeid,2003). The Wafd’s
leadership has rejected accusations that the party has given up its secular
character and has described the move as a pragmatic one intended to challenge
the government. However, such an alliance which would have been unthinkable
decades ago seemed presumably the only solution for the Wafdist to benefit from
the grassroots support of the Islamists, while giving the banned Islamist
movement the opportunity to use the Wafd as a jumping board to enter the
parliament. Undoubtedly, however, the departure of many Copts not only derived
the party of the largest minority in Egypt as voters and members, but also lost the
party essential financial contributions due to their connections as traders and
businessmen.
Loyalty to individuals rather than competence in party board selection
An examination of the Wafd’s Board illustrates a generational conflict between
members of the historical Wafd and those who entered the party after its revival.
The board selection is therefore a matter of “clan” loyalty rather than a reflection
of the most competent candidates. After the death of charismatic head Fouad
Serag el-Din, a rift in the party became clear and increasingly hampered the
party’s efforts to unite forces for the 2000 elections. Indeed, the race for
succession of the party’s leadership was a rivalry between allies of Serag el Din
and ‘newer’ members who had joined the party after its revival in 1978 and
lacked political experience in comparison. Because they were not part of the old
guard of the party, many younger members have attempted to downplay the
historical Wafd, while maintaining that the party must reform in order to adapt to
Egypt’s current political system and socio-economic reality (Shehab,2000). In
contrast, advocates of the “Serag El Din Clan” have used their name and
historical achievements in the Wafd party in order to gain legitimacy and hinder
younger party members from climbing the party ranks. Therefore, historical
Wafdist members like Abdel Fatah Hassan and Ibrahim Farag, who held ministry
post before the 1952 revolution, were rehabilitated in the party leadership at the
expense of newer members who expressed dissatisfied with the regime and tried
to use the Wafd as a political forum to counter the regime (Ebeid,2003). Indeed,
the centralized decision making process at the Wafd does not allow for the
distribution of power to lower level positions held by middle-class members, with
no ties to Serag el Din and his allies. As a result, many lower-middle class
members of the party have left the Wafd, accusing it of being an elitist party with
no interest in garnering grassroot support.
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The Wafd’s undemocratic structure hampers its call for democracy
Analyzing the internal structure of the Wafd, one notices that the lack of
separation of power between the executive and legislature branches does not
differ from the government’s absence of a check and balance. The centralized
power of the party chairman, who has the power to circumvent the party’s general
assembly and direct the party by decrees without legislative backup does not
differ from the strong executive in the Egyptian government, who can veto and
overrule the decisions of the Egyptian parliament (Ebeid,2003). Furthermore,
criticizing the chairman of the party is often labeled as breaking the bonds of the
party and endangering its unity and the Wafd party has become the property of
Serag el Din supporters who are not willing to separate their party from their
personal policies. These policies were exacerbated with the ascension of Gomaa
to party leadership as he has not only refused to consult party members by
announcing unilateral decisions contrary to the party’s principles, but has also
dismissed party members for criticizing his authority. In describing these
practices, Mona Makram Ebeid (2003) states that the Wafd’s inability to mobilize
the people and to use the party platform as a channel to challenge the regime is
an indication that the Wafd is closer to the ruling regime than it is to the people it
should represent.
In response to the above, it is recommended that the power of the chairman is
reduced, and the assembly allowed to veto his decision or to withdraw confidence
from him in case of his passing unconstitutional decrees. Another proposal, which
would force the chairman to adhere to the decisions of the assembly, is to limit
chairmen’s terms of power, and hold democratic elections that would rotate the
power at the top post of the party. Moreover, the assembly should not only
include members which are loyal to the chairman but should incorporate people
from different wings within the party. As a result, the assembly’s decision would
try to create a consensus decision, which would favor most of the wings of the
party, instead of just approving the decisions of the chairman or the old guard.

The Wafd collaborates with the government instead of confronting it
Rather than oppose the regime’s policies, Gomaa has made a policy of pleasing
the government into accepting the Wafd’s existence. In May 2003, the party
Gomaa dismissed Mahmoud El-Shazly, a Wafdist member of parliament from the
party (Essam El-Din,2003) after accusing him of violating the party course and
abusing his post for personal interests (Essam El-Din,2003). This, in addition to
Gomaa’s decision to withdraw the party membership from Gamal Heshmat, an
apparent Muslim Brother within the party, have lead many to criticize Gomaa for
weakening the position the Wafd in the parliament in order to please the
government. This opportunistic move does not correspond with an opposition
party, which tries to discredit the government. Moreover, the two dismissals
demonstrate that Gomaa does not accept any party “dissidents” and tries,
instead, to disqualify his opponents and place his own associates into the
parliament.
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Wafd’s membership focuses on narrow class interests
Historically speaking, sectarian, religious and geographical divides of society
were irrelevant in the Wafd’s representation of the people and its fight for
independence. An examination of at the Wafd’s membership composition now,
however, demonstrates a majority of upper-middle class professors and
academics. A survey conducted about the occupation of the Wafd leadership
showed that 62.8% have a doctorate in law, while only 5.7% belonged to the
military or the military technocrats (Hiinnebusch,1984). Therefore, not only
connections to the Serag el Din clan is a key to a top-position in the party ranks,
but also a well-respected academic job is guarantee for a career in the post.
Raymond Hinnebusch explains the high percentage of academics and
professional background of the party as a reflection of its liberal policies.
Moreover, the fact, that 52.9% of members own land and 70.6% were born in
provincial areas demonstrates that most of the Wafdists are landowners and
belong to the high bourgeoisie (Hinnebusch,1984). This formula can never
transform the Wafd in a mass popular party within Egypt, a country where the
majority of people are farmers and workers. It is doubtful that the party’s
“intellectuals” can serve the interests of the middle and lower middle class.
Conclusion
In examining the opposition parties in Egypt today, one can infer that they have
not yet proved to the public that they are a viable actor in the reform process. The
emergence of the opposition parties from within the system explains their
weakness in confronting the government and their choice of a cautious approach.
The Wafd, historically one of the strongest opposition parties in Egypt is plagued
with internal rivalries and issues personal loyalty which clearly affects its identity
as an opposition party. In order to gain the trust of a broader segment of society,
the Wafd should formulate a party program which reflects the current socioeconomic needs of the citizens, instead of playing with its old legacy as an elite
party. Moreover, it needs to reform its internal structure, so that the board
selection is not based on past achievements and clan loyalty but on the
readiness to enhance the party’s image as an opposition party.
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